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Introduction
Recently some U.S. scholars claim to have discovered the dark side of
the force: bureaucracy.' They tell us that "[b]ureaucracy is the primary
form of organized power in America today, and.., is therefore a pri-
mary target of those who seek liberation from modem forms of human
domination."' 2 Bureaucracy oppresses its clients simultaneously by dis-
cretion misused and by precise rules overused. As an alternative, some
critics of bureaucracy put forward roseate visions of participatory de-
mocracy, sometimes reduced to concrete proposals, 3 and sometimes as a
code-word for "the ideal under which the possibilities of joint transfor-
mation of social life are collected."' 4 Whatever the future of participatory
democracy in the United States, in today's Africa to abandon bureau-
cracy in pursuit of the chimera of participatory democracy will only en-
sure the perpetuation of poverty and vulnerability rooted in the
economic, political, and social institutions inherited from colonialism.
Unchanged despite independence, these institutions continue to grind out
wealth and power for a tiny minority (mostly non-African and living
overseas), and poverty and vulnerability for most Africans.
To address the problems of poverty and vulnerability requires new in-
stitutions that will bring about higher productivity, create ample employ-
t Professor of Law and Political Science, Boston University. I am indebted to Professors
Ann Seidman, Alan Feld, Jack Beerman, Aviam Soifer, Joseph Singer, Tamar Frankel, and
Neva Makgetla for useful comments, and to Risa Kane and Alvin Yearwood for research
assistance. Mistakes, of course, are mine alone. Mr. Anthony MacMillan, Solicitor General
and Chief Parliamentary Counsel for Zimbabwe, originally suggested the subject matter.
1. At least among lawyers, "bureaucracy" seems to have no agreed-upon definition. Com-
pare Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1278 n.2
(1984) (bureaucracy includes both public and private-especially corporate-hierarchies) with
Macneil, Bureaucracy, Liberalism, and Community-American Style, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 900,
904 (1985) (because most of us work in bureaucratically-organized institutions, "we are all
bureaucrats most, if not all, of the time"). In this article, I consider "bureaucracy" only with
respect to public hierarchies, and speak mainly to the problems of controlling the behavior of
their higher-level members.
2. Frug, supra note 1, at 1295.
3. See, e.g., J. COHEN & J. ROGERS, ON DEMOCRACY 146-83 (1983); cf. Macneil, supra
note I, at 939-43 ("community" as an "alternate vision" to participatory democracy).
4. Frug, supra note I, at 1296.
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ment opportunities, distribute income more equitably, and limit or
eliminate the export of economic surplus and instead channel it into in-
vestment at home in ways likely to create an economy with a high degree
of specialization and exchange. These changes can only occur if political
institutions change as well, to represent the interests not of the old polit-
ical and economic ruling classes, but of the mass of the population. De-
velopment necessitates institutional transformation. Institutions
appropriate for a colonial, capitalist mode of production must be drasti-
cally changed to permit development even in a capitalist mode. For de-
velopment in a socialist mode, they must be completely redesigned and
rebuilt.
However, the transformation of African political and economic institu-
tions appears unlikely without the use of state power. State power in
turn functions through rules of law that are implemented by bureau-
crats.5 Maybe someone, somewhere, will devise a way, without delegat-
ing authority to a bureaucrat, to permit participatory democracy to
decide where to locate a country's only steel mill, how to organize a cen-
tral bank and enforce its control over monetary policy and the banking
system, or how to determine which passenger aircraft are safe or which
drugs will not kill too many of their users. To date, no one has come
close. To make these decisions, the only form of organized power that
exists, or even hovers on the horizon, is bureaucracy. 6 In Africa, "those
who seek liberation from modern forms of human domination" must em-
ploy law and state power-and bureaucracy-to induce those economic,
political, and social institutional changes that constitute the development
process. 7 This requires not the abandonment of bureaucracy, but its
taming.
To tame bureaucracy, a legislative drafter must write laws that will, so
far as possible, induce officials to conform not only to the letter of the
law, but to its spirit-that is, she must write laws instrumentally. 8 A
5. The use of law and state power to facilitate development constitutes only a special case
of the general problem of the use of these tools to bring about social, political, and economic
change. See generally Auerbach, The Relation of Legal Systems to Social Change, 1980 Wis.
L. REV. 1227 (discussing the role of legal systems in maintaining social stability or bringing
about social change).
6. Cf Macneil, supra note 1, at 923 (management of a large-scale capital base requires
bureaucratic control).
7. Montgomery, A Royal Invitation: Variations on Three Classic Themes, in APPROACHES
TO DEVELOPMENT: POLITICS, ADMINISTRATION AND CHANGE 257 (J. Montgomery & W.
Siffin eds. 1966); see also id. at 261-62 ("[A]Imost nobody loves a bureaucracy, although no one
conceives of development without it.").
8. This article promotes an unabashedly instrumental perspective on law. But cf. Frug,
supra note 1, at 1292 (law not a set of rules prescribing behavior, but primarily a legitimating
ideology, "a structure that lawyers can use to formulate arguments for and against the activity
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Third World drafter cannot avoid the obligation to draft to enhance the
rule of law.9
Traditionally, the rule of law called for narrow grants of discretion. In
conditions of development, however, where uncertainty and turbulence
reign, legislatures can do little more than identify difficulties, allocate re-
sources, and give officials power to experiment with solutions-that is,
they must give officials wide discretion. Under these circumstances, how
can a drafter encourage legal behavior?
This article addresses the issue of bureaucracy from the perspective of
a drafter concerned with development in the Third World. It asks how,
using the tools available to a drafter, she can induce officials to conform
to the rules prescribed for their behavior, and how, when (as is usual)
nobody can devise a bright-line rule to prescribe specific behavior, she
can induce these officials to accomplish the law's objectives. '0 To answer
these questions, we first inquire why officials misbehave.
under review"). Viewing law primarily as a legitimating ideology resonates comfortably with
writers who decry the instrumental uses of law. See, e.g., Griffiths, Is Law Important?, 54
N.Y.U. L. REv. 339 (1979) (law has no causal relationship to behavior); Trubek & Galanter,
Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies
in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1062 (documents a growing conviction among schol-
ars in developing countries that law may have little effect on society); cf Buchanan, Politics,
Property and the Law: An Alternative Interpretation of Miller v. Shoene, 15 J. LAW & ECON.
439 (1972) (generally undesirable to use law to change institutional and property relationships
because of the possibility of interfering with market forces that promote efficient solutions to
disputes).
In this article, by the "legal order" I mean the formal and conventional rules that the state
enforces to prescribe behavior, and the tribe of people-judges, lawyers, civil servants, police,
jailers, and so forth-who create and implement those prescriptions. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 85-98. This definition assumes the law's instrumental use.
9. Drafters' manuals do not ordinarily address the issue of inducing official conformity to
the law. Reflecting the nineteenth-century British origins of legislative drafting, most manuals
describe drafters as concerned with the form, not the policy, of legislation. With respect to
form, they instruct drafters mainly how to draw precise lines between mine and thine, between
licit and illicit. See, e.g., E. DRIEDGER, THE COMPOSITION OF LEGISLATION: LEGISLATIVE
FORMS & PRECEDENTS 1-128 (1976) (Canada); G. THORNTON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING 102-
70 (2d ed. 1979) (United Kingdom); Special Project, Legislative Drafting in Federal Agencies,
21 CATH. U.L. REV. 707, 707-23 (1972) (United States). In practice, of course, drafters always
deal with policy. Cf H. READ, J. MACDONALD, J. FORDHAM & W. PIERCE, MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION 234 (4th ed. 1982) (supplies a checklist concerning the substance of legislation;
last item on the list states: "In the light of careful appraisal of your answers to the foregoing
questions, do you recommend the enactment of a new law? If so, draft the necessary bill.").
Almost alone among those involved in the long, frequently tedious process of bill creation,
drafters concern themselves with the details of legislation. Most politicians believe they fulfill
their policy functions by identifying a social problem and deciding to devote some resources to
its solution. Sometimes with guidance and assistance from the officials involved, sometimes
without, the drafter fills in the blanks. As much as the underlying policy, these details define
the bill's thrust and determine whether the law's lay and official addressees will obey it.
10. The difficulty of drafting a law in a developing country is well illustrated in the follow-
ing example, which I witnessed personally. In Zambia, the government wanted to induce the
formation of agricultural producer cooperatives. It passed a law providing that peasants who
cleared the bush would receive a set payment per acre, obviously to encourage peasants to
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I. Why Our Deviant Bureaucrats?
During the feudal and mercantilist eras, dominated by the aristocratic
conception of government, the power to govern coincided with property
ownership.11 In these aristocratic periods, self-interested, parochial rule
violated no premise of the dominant conception of government. During
the bourgeois democratic era, by contrast, the prevailing theory held as a
central proposition that no bureaucrat had a property interest in her
job. 12 Governors supposedly ruled in the interests of the governed. Peri-
odic elections were instituted to ensure that the elected government rep-
resented the interests of the majority of the people. The rule of law was
meant to ensure that the bureaucracy obeyed the laws embodying the
directives of the people's representatives.
When governmental and bureaucratic decision-making failed to live up
to these expectations, a variety of theories arose to explain the failure of
the state to represent the mass of the population. Every contemporary
theory of the state seeks to explain the abuse of official power-in socio-
logical terms, goal-substitution.
A. Goal-Substitution, the Deadlock of Development Administration,
and the Drafting Problem
1. Goal-Substitution
In the developed and developing worlds alike, goal-substitution infects
bureaucracy at every level. "Goal-substitution" refers to the process by
which an official substitutes some other goal for that established for her
position by higher authority.1 3 For example, a hospital has the overall
mission of preserving life and health. As part of that overall task, an
admissions nurse in the emergency ward must record a new patient's
name, address, next of kin, and hospitalization insurance data. To get
that information the nurse questions an accident victim, meanwhile let-
bring more acreage into agricultural production. The rule worked to a degree: whole coopera-
tives earned their livings by clearing plots of land and then going on to clear more plots.
However, nobody planted the cleared land. By contrast, elsewhere in Africa schemes for
peasant agriculture have sometimes succeeded in producing more crops and improving peasant
incomes, sometimes quite spectacularly-with maize in Zimbabwe, rice in western Tanzania,
coffee in Kenya. How could Zambia's drafters have written rules so as to achieve a higher
degree of productivity in Zambian cooperatives? With respect to official behavior, the same
drafting problem emerges: how to draft rules making likely a high degree of conformity.
11. POLITICAL CORRUPTION: READINGS IN COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 10-15 (A. Heiden-
heimer ed. 1970).
12. Id.; cf M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 344 (A.
Henderson & T. Parsons trans., T. Parsons ed. 1957) (ideal-type of bureaucracy requires "'a
complete absence of appropriation of his official position by the incumbent").
13. See Selznick, An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy, 8 AM. Soc. REV. 49 (1943)
(defining goal-substitution).
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ting him bleed to death. The nurse in this case has rearranged official
priorities. For the overall goal of the hospital-saving lives-she has
substituted the goal set for her position. When a politician takes a bribe
to make a discretionary decision favoring a particular businessman, goal-
substitution again occurs. The politician substitutes her personal goal of
self-aggrandizement for the broader goals of the state.
Goal-substitution lies at the heart of arbitrary government and encom-
passes the core of complaints that scholars raise against a bureaucracy:
[It results in] resistance to change, rigid adherence to rules, reluctance to
delegate authority, sycophancy toward superiors, "target" mentality, indif-
ference to the standards of efficiency, ignorance of the purposes behind reg-
ulations, generalist-elitist orientation combined with hostility toward
technology (especially in the despised field of agriculture), insistence on sta-
tus and prestige symbols, "formalism" or adherence to traditional relation-
ships while desiring to appear modem; and, not to put too fine a point on it,
job-stocking and over-staffing, corruption, xenophobia, and nepotism. 14
The rule of law and socialist legality alike have as their principal thrust
the avoidance of goal-substitution by government officials.' 5 Both
14. Montgomery, supra note 7, at 262.
15. Those two analogous legal ideologies arose under very different circumstances. The
nineteenth-century entrepreneurial class required of the law above all else predictability, with-
out which their investments stood at risk. See, eg., Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the Rise
of Capitalism, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 270; A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 778 (Modern Library ed. 1937) ("[A] very considera-
ble degree of inequality, it appears, I believe, from the experience of all nations, is not near so
great an evil as a very small degree of uncertainty."). A rogue bureaucrat who substituted her
goals for those of the statute made government decisions unpredictable. The ideology of the
rule of law reflected entrepreneurial desires for predictability. See Handler, Discretion in Social
Welfare: The Uneasy Position in the Rule of Law, 92 YALE L.J. 1270, 1275 (1983); W. CHAM-
BLISS & R. SEIDMAN, LAW, ORDER AND POWER 59-60 (2d ed. 1982). To achieve predictabil-
ity, the rule of law required officials to obey the law. It justified that principle in the name of
individual rights.
Socialist legality reached an analogous conclusion, but for different reasons. Faced with the
necessity of keeping a complex, highly bureaucratized, centrally-planned economy and society
functioning, socialist states had to ensure that bureaucratic behavior followed the rules, or else
planning came to naught. Socialist jurisprudence encapsulated the principle of strict obser-
vance of law in the concept of socialist legality. See, e.g., HUNG. CONST. art. 77, para. 3 ("It is
the duty of every organ of the State ... to observe the Constitution and constitutional rules of
law. .. "), quoted in Markovits, Law or Order-Constitutionalism and Legality in Eastern
Europe, 34 STAN. L. REV. 513, 516 (1982). By "legality," modern socialist constitutions mean
"obedience and loyalty towards the socialist state and its commands... [,J identification with a
collective goal and continuous vigilance against those who might endanger its realization." Id,
at 518. Although socialist legality justified its claims with reference to the necessity of operat-
ing a planned economy, it reached the same doctrinal conclusion about legality as did the rule
of law: officials must obey the law. To the extent that the law prescribed non-arbitrary behav-
ior, socialist legality served to protect individuals against arbitrary state action; indeed, its
modern renaissance arose in response to the Stalinist outrages. But see id. at 522 ("Despite
their insistence on law and legality, modern East European constitutions are not expressing
bourgeois... Rule of Law... notions; they only reflect the conviction of socialist governments
that discipline, regularity, and order will further their administrations' goals.").
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suggest a necessary characteristic of responsible government: officials
must obey the law. To achieve that objective we must first identify the
problems raised by goal-substitution.
The first problem involving goal-substitution concerns the structure of
bureaucracy itself. The colonial administration perceived itself as con-
cerned mainly with law, order, and tax-collection. 16 The ideal type of a
law-and-order and tax-collecting administration prescribes a hierarchi-
cal, bureaucratic structure applying bright-line rules that precisely define
decision and require relatively little exercise of official discretion.
17
Bright-line rules generally allow less room for goal-substitution than
vague ones.
In development situations, however, turbulence prevails. No legisla-
ture knows all the answers, and bright-line rules can exist only if some-
one in a position of responsibility and power does know the answers.
Discretion permits officials to experiment, to learn from experience how
to solve the complexities of development. Development therefore re-
quires the radical transformation of a rule-oriented, tax-collecting, law-
and-order bureaucracy into a problem-solving development administra-
tion, a transformation from a regime of bright-line rules to a regime of
broad grants of discretion. Discretion unguarded, however, can become
a fertile seed-bed for goal-substitution.
The second problem is that officials' goal-substitutions tend systemati-
cally to favor the rich and powerful and to disadvantage the poor and
powerless.18 This happens for two reasons. By definition, elite members
16. See A. ADU, THE CIVIL SERVICE IN THE NEW AFRICAN STATES 14-23 (1965); Schaf-
fer, The Deadlock in Development Administration, in POLITICS AND CHANGE IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: STUDIES IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF DEVELOPMENT 177, 179 (C. Leys
ed. 1969); E. Nwosu, THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION: A VIEWPOINT 7
(1974).
17. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 55-57 (1969). In
practice, colonial officials had virtually unbridled discretion when dealing with Africans. In
Southern Rhodesia, for example, it was criminal for Africans to disobey an unlawful but "rea-
sonable" order of a District Officer. Proclamation No. 55 of 1910, at 14, cited in Seidman, The
Individual i African Law: Zimbabwe's New Primary Courts, in THE INDIVIDUAL UNDER AF-
RICAN LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST ALL-AFRICA LAW CONFERENCE 95-99 (P.
Takirambudde ed. 1982). See also The King v. The Earl of Crewe (ex parte Sekgome), [1910]
2 K.B. 576 (High Commissioner detained without trial a candidate for chieftainship. While it
might seem incongruous that the British administration retained power to detain without trial
when Bechuanaland had its own complete criminal code, the Court stated that the matter
became easier to understand when one remembered that in Bechuanaland a "few... civilized
men have to control a great multitude of the semi-barbarous." Id. at 610.).
18. See Marx & Engels, The Communist Manifesto, reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS
READER 475 (R. Tucker ed. 1978) (bourgeois state an executive committee for the capitalist
class). This idea resonates easily with another central Marxist proposition, that the law consti-
tutes a mere epiphenomenon of the mode of production, a superstructure erected upon a mate-
rial base. Marx, The German Ideology, reprinted in id. at 3, 4. These explanations spawned a
range of Marxist theories of the state. See. e.g., R. MILIBAND, THE STATE IN CAPITAI.IST
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of society have preferred access to decision-making' 9-and bureaucrats
favor those with such access. Moreover, their own self-interest leads bu-
reaucrats to exercise their power and discretion to maximize rewards and
minimize strains for themselves and their organizations. Those with
power and privilege-principally the members of the ruling economic
class-usually have the greatest opportunity to create strains and allo-
cate rewards. Therefore, bureaucrats will exercise discretion in ways
contrary to the purposes of the empowering law-that is, they will sub-
stitute personal for organizational goals-most frequently to favor the
rich and powerful.20 Thus, in Africa as elsewhere, private goal-substitu-
tions by individual bureaucrats have tended to become goal-substitutions
in favor of the ruling economic class.21
Most African governments have articulated a rhetoric of socialism.
For them, the tendency of goal-substitution to favor the rich and power-
ful poses a special hurdle. Socialism does not come into existence with a
pen-stroke. African countries that seriously espouse a socialist solution
to poverty and vulnerability face at best a long, storm-plagued passage
from the existing institutional arrangements to ones appropriate for a
socialist organization of society. That transition requires that economic
and political power shift from those presently at the top of the heap to
the mass of the population. Goal-substitutions that favor the rich and
powerful therefore frustrate a government's populist and socialist objec-
tives, constituting not merely one of development's many seemingly in-
soluble problems, but its core difficulty.
SOcIETY (1969) (state an instrument of capitalist class); N. POULANTZAS, CLASSES IN CON-
TEMPORARY CAPITALISM (1975) (capitalist class influences state by way of state structure;
state has "relative autonomy," but capitalist class will ineluctably control it "in the final in-
stance"). Because the principal goal of these theories was to explain the state in modern, post-
industrial, capitalist polities, they did not directly address the problem of the uses of state
power to bring about radical social transformation. If the base determines the superstruc-
ture-if, in Africa, the "colonial capitalist mode of production" determines the state-then an
African government could not hope to change the state structure before changing the mode of
production. Yet, if one cannot use the existing state structure, and hence state power, to
change the mode of production, nothing remains except to join Professor Frug and the expo-
nents of "deadlock" in deploring the sad inevitability of it all. See, e.g., Williams, The Authori-
tarianisin of African Legal Orders: A Review and Critique of Robert B. Seidnian'v The State,
Law and Development, 5 CONTEMP. CRISs 255 (1980) (after independence, African leaders
had no choice save to make their economies appendages to world capitalist system), Instead of
taking as a given the control of the state by the economic ruling class, a theory for changing
Third World institutional structures must take that control as a contingent possibility.
19. See generally G. PARRY, POIITICAI. ELITES (1970); T. BOrroMORI, EI.ITF.S AND SO-
CIiTY (1964) (discussing elites' role in governing and the tension between reality of elites and
the ideal of equality).
20. W. CHAMBIISS & R. SEIDMAN, supra note 15, at 285-300.
21. See generally A. SEIDMAN & N. SEIDMAN, SOUTH AFRICA AND U.S. MUI.'INA-
TIONAI. CORPORArIONS (1977).
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For this difficulty, the rule of law and socialist legality suggest a possi-
ble solution. The traditions encapsulated in the rule of law teach that
bright-line rules can tame goal-substitution. Yet development requires
discretion. Thus emerges the specter of the deadlock of development
administration.
2. The Deadlock of Development Administration
The contradiction between development's demands for discretion and
the classical bright-line formulation of the rule of law produces another
of development's endless vicious spirals. Development means change.
Change requires a government to solve novel problems: "[H]ierarchy
and routinization are appropriate institutional characteristics of the clas-
sic governmental tasks of maintaining order, collecting taxes and provid-
ing services," but "flexibility and innovation are the traits a bureaucracy
needs in development."' 22 Flexibility and innovation call for broad offi-
cial discretion.
That proposition flies in the face of the dogmas that equate the rule of
law with bright-line rules and limited discretion. 23 "A country might
enjoy instrumentality, predictability and equality before the law, but
must therefore suffer authority, narrow discretion and compartmental-
ized, hierarchical decisionmaking. It might enjoy change, creativity and
flexibility, and discretion and goal-substitution. One cannot have both
[the advantages of discretion and bright-line rules] simultaneously. That
becomes the 'deadlock' of development administrations.
'24
22. D. DRESANG, THE ZAMBIA CIVIL SERVICE: A STUDY IN DEVELOPMENT ADMINIS-
TRATION (1975), quoted in R. SEIDMAN, THE STATE, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 226 (1978).
23. Max Weber, who invented bureaucracy's ideal-type, insisted that "'equality before the
law' and the demand for legal guarantees against arbitrariness demand a formal and rational
'objectivity' of administration as opposed to the personally free discretion flowing from the
'grace' of the old patrimonial domination." FROM MAX WEBER, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 220
(H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans. 1958). The pursuit of this goal required bright-line
rules.
Dicey, who in modem times reinvented the concept of the rule of law, earlier said much the
same thing. The rule of law meant:
[T]hat no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for
a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary
courts of the land. In this sense the rule of law is contrasted with every system of govern-
ment based on the exercise by persons in authority of wide, arbitrary, or discretionary
powers of constraint.
A. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 188 (10th ed.
1959). In Weber's formulation, bright-line rules gained "legal-rational" or "bureaucratic" le-
gitimacy; in Dicey's, they became the badge of the rule of law.
24. R. SI:IDMAN, THE STATE, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 227 (1978); see also Schaffer,
The Deadlock in Development Administration, in POLITICS AND CHANGE IN DEVEI.OPING
COUNrRI.S: STUDIES IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF DEVEI.OPMENT 177 (C. Leys ed.
1969). The same "deadlock" affects the legal orders of the developed countries. See Frug,
supra note 1, at 1288-89 (rules and discretion constitute a "dangerous supplement" to each
other); Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy & Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198, 1223
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If this deadlock holds, it puts an end to hopes for development in favor
of the masses. The deadlock has its roots in goal-substitution. It seems
insoluble, however, only because the formulation assumes that officials
always exercise discretion improperly and thus erode legality. A strong
probability of goal-substitution of course exists, but that probability con-
stitutes the problem that must be explained and solved. In solving that
problem, drafters play a special role.
3. The Drafting Problem
Like other lawyers, drafters have a responsibility to assure their clients
that their legal product will function as promised. Whatever illusions
existed in an earlier, perhaps more naive era, today we know that politi-
cians introduce some laws not for instrumental but for symbolic pur-
poses.25 Drafters sometimes cynically go along with their clients.
Usually, however, the drafter fashions the law as though it had a clear
instrumental purpose. No drafting text teaches drafters to write sym-
bolic law. Those texts deal (albeit narrowly) with law's instrumental
functions.26 So, inevitably, do drafters.
Law must induce the behavior it prescribes as an instrument for social
change, or a statute will not accomplish its purpose.2 7 Officials must
obey the law.28 Drafters must write laws that simultaneously grant
discretionary power to the appropriate officials and induce them to use
that power for the common weal as defined by the statutory language.29
At the heart of legislative drafting lie the dilemmas of allocating and
controlling discretion. 30 Ministers and civil servants usually deny that
(1983) (dominant legal ideology "contrasts legality with discretion and prescribes the elimina-
tion or minimization of discretion").
25. See, e.g., J. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN
TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (1966); M. EDLEMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964),
26. See, e.g., H. THRING, PRACTICAL LEGISLATION: THE COMPOSITION AND LANGUAGE
OF ACTS OF PARLIAMENT AND BUSINESS DOCUMENTS (2d ed. 1902); C. ILBERT, LEGISLA-
TIVE METHODS AND FORMS (1901); R. DICKERSON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING 3-16 (1954); S.
NAMASIVAYAM, THE DRAFTING OF LEGISLATION (1967); G. THORNTON, LEGISLATIVE
DRAFTING 102-26 (2d ed. 1979); Kennedy, Legislative Bill Drafting, 31 MINN. L, REV. 103
(1946).
27. See Blankenburg, The Waning of Legality, 1985 LAW & POL'Y 481, 482 ("Legislators
do consider factors which influence the likelihood of compliance with their decisions .... ),
28. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765) (sometimes described as the foundation
of the British Constitution).
29. The same task increasingly confronts U.S. law. See, e.g., Rabin, Legitimacy, Discre-
tion, and the Concept of Rights, 92 YALE L.J. 1174, 1188 (1983) ("[P]aradigm Public Interest
cases, dealing with pollution, ecological, health and safety rules, raise concerns about bureau-
cratic rationality rather than about particularized rights. As a result, the concept of right has
become... almost lost in a rising concern about a wide variety of techniques for controlling
discretion in programs affecting broad-based societal interests.").
30. The development demands of discretionary power in officials arise from the demands
of social justice. Western scholars have more frequently addressed the demands of individual
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legislated discretion poses a problem. Government must get on with its
job. To do so, its officials need power and therefore discretion. Every
law they propose, they expect to administer. They assert that they are
upright and competent, and oppose every fetter on their exercise of
discretion.
Laws, however, outlast particular officials. The next official may be
neither competent nor upright, nor will he necessarily have the same per-
spective as the current minister. Drafters draft for future governments as
well as sitting ones. Alone in the law-making process, their role requires
them to protect the rule of law. A legislative drafter cannot avoid the
responsibility thrust upon her post. A Third World drafter cannot sur-
render to the deadlock of development administration and the acquies-
cent philosophy that it implies. How can the drafter escape the
deadlock?
B. Reasons for Goal-Substitution
Our examination of goal-substitution has identified a key dilemma of
development. Solutions to a problem must explain its causes in order to
address them. This section, therefore, will attempt to explain bureau-
cratic goal-substitution.
A drafter deals with the law. In an examination of a particular pattern
of goal-substitution, she must devise an explanation that reveals how the
legal order "causes" the behavior in question. Only in this way can she
devise a legislative solution. An explanation must constitute a "theory of
the middle range" 3 1-i.e., a proposition, general in form, of which the
behavior at issue constitutes a particular example. To devise a middle-
range theory requires a set of concepts likely to focus the drafter's think-
ing and research on relevant theories and data-that is, it demands a
vocabulary of law and behavior.
The search for that vocabulary constitutes the burden of this section.
This section first offers a general paradigm of behavior and law; second,
it lists a set of variables to explain why people obey a rule of law prescrib-
ing behavior; and third, it addresses more extensively the structure of
decision-making institutions as it affects official opportunity and capacity
to obey the law.
justice. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, supra note 17, at 5-6 (concerned only "with that part of discre-
tionary power which pertains to justice, and with that portion of justice which pertains to
individual parties"); Frug, supra note 1 (suggests four "models" for legitimizing bureaucracy
teased out of U.S. judicial opinions; all four address issues of justice within existing
institutions).
31. See A. GOULDNER, THE COMING CRISIS OF WESTERN SOCIOLOGY (1970).
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1. A General Paradigm of Behavior and Law
Notwithstanding some drafters' notions of their own importance and
power, a drafter cannot play God. She has only a limited, rather blunt
tool at her command. A drafter can only write rules that prescribe repet-
itive patterns of behavior. By definition, a repetitive pattern of behavior
constitutes an institution: A drafter's sole tool to correct a social evil is
the prescription of an institution.
Any theory seeking to explain the use of such a tool must explain not
why a law's addressees fail to obey it,32 but why they conform to it at
all.33 A law addressed to persons who fill roles in implementing organi-
zations-administrators, police, judges, secretaries, government minis-
ters, directors of public corporations, and others-frequently requires its
addressees to behave in ways at odds with their own interests and beliefs.
Less obviously, it requires the addressees to act in ways that the existing
institutional surroundings make difficult or impossible.3 4 Not deviance,
but conformity, often constitutes the surprising type of behavior. Unless
a drafter has a theory explaining why law-implementors occasionally
obey the law, she cannot draft law with much chance of inducing
conformity.
Drafters seek to solve problems caused by particular patterns of behav-
ior by writing rules that prescribe behavior. Institutions consist of actual
behavior. Unless a systematic relationship exists between prescriptions
and actual behavior, no drafter can hope, save by serendipity, to draft a
rule of law that will change behavior. For example, unless a policeman
knows of a rule of law, he cannot knowingly conform to it. Therefore, a
policeman who does not know of a law will more likely violate it than
one who does. A possible hypothesis would explain police conformity to
law in part by the policeman's knowledge of the law-i.e., by the com-
munication of the rule.
Explanations of why a law-implementor conforms to the law prescrib-
ing her behavior must therefore rest on a theory of the systematic rela-
tionship between the legal order and behavior. Among the factors
contributing to a particular behavior (that is, one of its "causes") is its
32. H. JOHNSON, SOCIOLOGY: A SYSTEMATIC INTRODUCTION 552 (1960) (Deviant be-
havior is not merely behavior that violates a norm, but behavior that violates a norm "to which
the actor is oriented at the time; it is motivated violation."). To use deviance as the central
concept with which to examine why people obey or disobey a law assumes that actors are
oriented to the law that they violate. In many cases, that kind of analysis misses the point.
33. R. SEIDMAN, supra note 24, at 101.
34. See Kuper, The Influence of Council Structure on Decision-Making, in COUNCILS IN
ACTION 28 (A. Richards & A. Kuper eds. 1971) ("a greater respect for institutional con-
straints" should be brought into the current interest in decision-making); J. FARMER, TRIIIU-
NAIS ANt) GOVF.RNMENT 167 (1974) ("Lawyers have not studied .. . the effects which
institutional and procedural matters have on the decision-making process.").
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social (that is, "institutional") milieu. To the extent one can give a sys-
tematic account of how the institutions that comprise the social sur-
roundings affect individual behavior in the face of a rule of law, one
teaches a drafter how to draft rules more likely to induce the desired
behavior.
To take another example, suppose that research discovered that a set
of officials made decisions that violated the constitutional requirements
of non-discrimination-that is, they substituted their personal, racist
goals for those defined by the constitution. A psychologist may "ex-
plain" that behavior by the officials' subjective racist biases. That alone,
however, does not help a drafter whose immediate concern is not with
eliminating sources of bias but with ensuring color-blind official decision-
making. An explanation adequate for the drafter's purposes must ex-
plain those discriminatory decisions in terms of the laws affecting the
officials. The drafter must examine the institutions that shaped those of-
ficials' psychologies and ideologies, selected them for their positions, kept
them in place, and permitted them to substitute their private goals for the
public ones they should have been pursuing. The drafter must then ex-
amine the laws that define and structure those institutions. Only in this
way can she begin to draft rules to remedy the situation, for a law forbid-
ding people to hold racist ideas will hardly succeed of itself in changing
their ideologies. Thus a drafter must "explain" behavior in terms of the
legal and institutional order.
The question then becomes, how do individuals act in the face of a rule
of law? Action implies choice. The simplest model of society consists of
people and collectivities acting-that is, choosing-within a world they
did not choose. The constraints and resources of their arena of choice
channel their action. It is as though the actor were walking through a
forest filled with trees, rocks, swamps, ponds, and rivers. He must
choose his path within the constraints and resources found in the forest.
Without divine intervention, he cannot pass through a rock wall or walk
on water. By describing the traveller's world-the external forest and his
subjective appreciation of it-we can explain his actions and the causes
of his behavior. Based on that explanation we can propose ways to rear-
range his milieu-by driving a tunnel through the rock wall, perhaps, or
by bridging the river-and thus restructure his arena of choice. We ex-
plain behavior by describing choice.
In a politically-organized society, every person's arena of choice in-
cludes the bonds and prods and opportunities of the legal order. Fre-
quently, of course, these seem mere pinpricks compared with the other
institutional, physical, and psychological constraints that populate that
arena. For the drafter, however, they become the particular "cause"
upon which she must focus.
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By the legal order I mean more than the black letter text-statutes,
ordinances, subsidiary legislation, regulations of all sorts. I include also
the institutions which create laws and which administer, implement, and
adjudicate them. When an individual acts within his milieu, he must
take this entire amalgam of individuals and institutions into account.
Faced with a rule, and with the possibility that implementing agencies
will engage in a variety of different behaviors (themselves operating in
the face of a rule within their arenas of choice), the addressee acts by
choosing. So too do bureaucrats when faced with a rule of law prescrib-
ing their behavior.
35
A law addressed to a primary addressee (the "role occupant") also
addresses an implementing agency, directing it to implement the law by
applying a conformity-inducing measure. 36 If we place an official in the
position of role occupant, it becomes apparent that institutions erected to
implement the laws directed at the official frequently seem diffuse and
relatively ineffective. Affected individuals can of course bring an action
to set aside an improper administrative decision-usually a costly and
lethargic procedure. In England, the government minister, and in much
of English-speaking Africa,37 only an independent civil service commis-
sion, can discipline a senior civil servant. (In practice, short of a rape in
a Bond Street shop window, disciplinary action is rarely taken.)
Implicitly recognizing the weaknesses of the implementing agencies di-
rected at officials, H.L.A. Hart argued that it becomes "crucial" that offi-
cials share a common acceptance of "the rule of recognition containing
the system's criteria of validity"-that is, that they conform to those
highest-order rules without external compulsion. Absent that voluntary
continuity, a legal order cannot exist. 38 Widespread goal-substitution in
most governments suggests that official consensus on applicable rules and
a sense of official obligation to obey them has, to a degree, dissipated. To
induce compliance with the law in most developed and developing coun-
tries a drafter can no longer rely upon shared ideologies, domain assump-
tions, and values among the ruling elite-witness the recently-disclosed
doings of the Reagan Administration in the Iran-Contra scandal. (Upon
what other factors a drafter might rely, of course, constitutes the burden
of this essay.)
35. R. SEIDMAN, supra note 24, at 74-75.
36. Id. Unless an implementing agency exists, a system of law-like norms may command
allegiance and induce conforming behavior; according to my definition, however, these norms
do not constitute "law." Cf H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW Ch. VI (1961) (without secon-
dary rules addressed to officials, a legal system does not exist).
37. See, e.g., ZIMB. CONST. § 75(l)(d).
38. H. HART, supra note 36, at 111.
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Thus, like other role occupants, officials act by choosing within the
range of constraints and resources of their milieu. Within this milieu, the
threats and promises of the formal legal order constitute only one ele-
ment-more frequently than not a rather weak and insignificant ele-
ment-affecting choice. We turn next to an examination of the relevant
categories of constraints and resources.
2. Behavior in the Face of a Rule of Law
39
Accepting that role occupants act by choosing within the constraints
and resources of their physical, social, and subjective environments, the
following proposition sets a research agenda to map those environments.
A person will likely obey a law if:
a) a rule prescribes her behavior;
b) she has the opportunity to obey the law;
c) she has the capacity to obey it;
d) the law is communicated to her;
e) her interests (including threat of sanction) encourage obedience;
f) she decides in a public, participatory process whether or not she will
obey; and
g) her ideology (beliefs, values, tastes) is compatible with the desired
behavior.
For these, "ROCCIPI" makes a convenient acronym.
These seven categories serve to trigger hypotheses to explain specific
instances of official behavior. A role occupant will likely follow the pre-
scriptions of law if, but only if, the sum of these factors induces obedi-
ence. For example, when an official decides in favor of a party who has
bribed her, she responds to her interests. A bureaucrat who does not
understand the purposes of the law (i.e., where a failure of communica-
tion exists) will implement it at best woodenly. In Zimbabwe, for exam-
ple, older officials socialized under the old (Rhodesian) regime repeatedly
misinterpreted the new socialist government's directives, despite the fact
that at least some of these officials had internalized the civil service ethic
of conscientiously serving the government of the day. They failed to im-
plement government policy not out of recalcitrance, but out of ignorance.
Similarly, by expressing itself ambiguously, 4° or by explicitly granting
39. See generally H. JONES, THE EFFICACY OF LAW (1969); Seidman, Why Do People
Obey the Law? The Case of Corruption in the Developing Countries, 5 BRIT. J. L. & Soc'Y 45
(1978); Evan, Law as an Instrument of Social Change, in APPLIED SOCIOLOGY:
OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBLEMS 285 (A. Gouldner & S. Miller eds. 1965).
40. Some contemporary writers argue that law is always indeterminate. See, e.g., Singer,
The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); H. VAN GUN-
STEREN, THE QUEST FOR CONTROL 86-87 (1976). If that view corresponds with reality, the
project of using law to change behavior-whether in a developed or a developing country-
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broad, unstructured discretion, a rule may itself make goal-substitution
more likely.
As another example, the Prisons Act of Ghana requires that wardens
keep the prisoners separate from one another.41 Every warden in the
hundred-year history of Ghana's prisons has violated that law daily, for
never has Ghana had fewer than twice as many prisoners as prison
cells. 42 The wardens lack the capacity to obey.
A drafter may also ask whether a particular set of goal-substitutions
results from the official's lack of qualifications. An official appointed as a
Roads Commissioner on a patronage basis will less likely succeed in
meeting the goal set for the position than will a graduate civil engineer
with five years practical experience in road-building. He too lacks
capacity.
These factors (ROCCIPI) thus help to generate explanations for the
variety of behaviors that emerge in the face of a law. With respect to
officials, the structure and processes of decision-making institutions
largely define the decision-makers' opportunities and capacities to con-
form to the law. I turn now to a model of decision-making institutions.
3. The Structure of Decision-Making Institutions
43
A decision-making institution consists of the repetitive behavioral pat-
terns of its members. We must study both the repetitive behavior itself-
the working rules, or the law-in-action-and the behavior that the rules
prescribe-the law-in-the-books. Preventing goal-substitution requires
that the law-in-the-books prescribing decision-making consists of norms
that (1) if followed, are likely to result in official behavior apt to achieve
the law-maker's objectives, and (2) will have a substantial probability of
inducing officials to conform to the rule. A rule that requires judges to
give female academics a remedy for discriminatory university employ-
ment decisions probably meets the first of these requirements. The fact
that so many women claim discrimination on the part of university
tenuring officials argues that such a rule does not meet the second re-
quirement. 44 To help analyze official opportunity and capacity to make
the decisions which the law requires, this section proposes a simple sys-
becomes impossible. That project depends upon an ability to communicate desired behavior to
its addressees; if law wallows in ambiguity, the requisite communication cannot occur.
41. Prisons Ordinance, 1876 (Gold Coast) Reg. 14.
42. Seidman, The Ghanaian Penal System: An Historical Perspective, U. GHANA L.J. 89,
95, 100 (1966), reprinted in A. MILNER, AFRICAN PENAL SYSTEMS 429, 437, 442 (1969).
43. See generally R. SEIDMAN, supra note 24, at, ch. 11 (1978); Seidman, How a Bill
Became a Law in Zimbabwe: On the Problem of Transforming the Colonial State, 52 AFRICA
No. 3, at 56 (1982).
44. See W. CHAMBLISS & R. SEIDMAN, supra note 15, at 292-300.
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tems model to explain decisions in terms of the repetitive patterns of be-
havior that define decision-making institutions.
The outputs of a decision-making institution consist of the decisions it
produces. A particular decision ("output") results from the issues, facts,
and theories that the institution throws up to the decision-makers for
their consideration ("inputs"). A decision results also from the informa-
tion received by the decision-makers about the results of their own earlier
decisions ("feedbacks"). 45 Finally, it results from the way the institution
combines the various inputs and feedbacks to arrive at a decision ("con-
version processes").
46
What inputs and feedbacks a decision-maker receives, and the conver-
sion processes she uses, depend upon the behavior of the people involved
in the decision-making system. If a decision-maker consults only those
with wealth and influence, she is likely to face different issues, and act on
different facts and theories, than if she holds a public hearing at which
people with different interests bring forward alternative issues, facts, and
theories. Whom a decision-maker consults results from the working
rules of the decision-making institution.47 By carefully designing the
law-in-the-books governing decision-making institutions, the law-maker
will more likely induce behavior that will generate a range of inputs,
feedbacks, and conversion processes appropriate for decisions that con-
form to the institution's prescribed goals. As every common law lawyer
quickly learns, procedure bears a systematic relationship to substance.
45. See Baldwin & Hawkins, Discretionary Justice: Davis Reconsidered, 5 PUB. L. 570, 581
(1984) (the facts of the case are "the products of the complex legal and organizational
processes in which reality is socially constructed and reconstructed").
To the extent that the feedback loop flourishes, decision-making becomes a learning experi-
ence for decision-makers. As they learn, they devise more particularized rules to deal with
repetitive fact patterns. This constitutes the principal function of a feedback loop. But cf
Gifford, Discretionary Decision-Making in the Regulatory Agencies: A Conceptual Framework,
57 S. CAL. L. REV. 101, 104 (1983) (describing agency work as resolving cases in which factual
components rarely repeat themselves). See also Deutsch, Social Mobilization and Political De-
velopment, 55 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 493 (1961); W. BUCKLEY, SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN SYS-
TEMS THEORY 55-56 (1967).
46. The model derives from one proposed by Robert Dahl. R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?
DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1961). In its usual form, the model aims
to explain particular decisions, taking as a given the patterned behavior of the several roles that
comprise the system. So stated, the model directs attention only to issues that actually come to
decision and to the available range of choice. It does not analyze "nondecision." Cf. P. BACH-
RACH & M. BARATZ, POWER AND POVERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1970).
47. Theorists have sometimes drawn a distinction between personified and aggregationist
views of complex organizations. See, e.g., M. DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS AND ORGANI-
ZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1986). This article adopts an
uncompromising aggregationist perspective; it perceives organizations as the sum of the repeti-
tive patterns of behavior of the individuals who fill the various organizational roles. The sub-
ject matter requires that perspective, for this article seeks to explain individual or
organizational goal-substitution in terms of the rules that help shape those repetitive patterns
of behavior.
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The general model of behavior and law, the heuristics for which ROC-
CIPI represents an acronym, and the decision-making model add up to a
very general explanation for why people act in conformity with a rule
prescribing their behavior. This explanation provides a vocabulary with
which to discuss official goal-substitution and suggests a wide range of
areas that a drafter must consider if she is to resolve the dilemmas of
development and legality.
II. Issues in Drafting for the Rule of Law
Law must empower officials to make decisions, while simultaneously
channeling that power towards the public objectives for which the gov-
ernment enacts the legislation, and preventing its misuse through goal-
substitution. To achieve these ends, the explanations for goal-substitu-
tion put forward earlier suggest issues that a drafter ought to address. 48
We discuss in order: (1) drafting issues that arise from the explanations
for behavior offered above; (2) solutions addressed to the causes of goal-
substitution lodged in the structure of decision-making institutions; and
(3) institutions to implement rules that prescribe official conduct.
A. Drafting Issues Raised by the Factors Affecting Behavior
1. Rule
For a drafter, the form of a particular rule raises two principal issues:
the scope of substantive discretion granted and the vocabulary employed
in the drafting. With respect to the former, a drafter can write a rule that
locates the official's discretion anywhere along a continuum from a
bright-line rule ("pilots must retire at age 60") to a vague generality ("pi-
48. Scholars have proposed various alternative catalogues of devices to control administra-
tive officials. In Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1500
n.63 (1963), Professor Martin Shapiro lists a "rather standard repertoire of possible constraints
on administrative discretion ... (I) creating substantive standards, rules and statements that
constrain the range of lawful agency choice; (2) creating procedural rules for constraining the
process by which the agency makes choices; (3) requiring the agency to create its own substan-
tive rules; (4) requiring the agency to create its own procedural rules; (5) requiring the agency
to establish and follow precedents; (6) requiring the agency to give reasons." Elliot, The Disin-
tegration of Administrative Law: A Comment on Shapiro, 92 YALE L.J. 1523, 1534-35 (1983)
adds five more recent techniques: actions for damages and injunctive relief, the Freedom of
Information Act, advisory committees, legislative oversight, and cost-benefit analyses by the
Office of Management and Budget. See also K. DAVIS, supra note 17, at 55-57 (discussing
administrative rule-makihg to limit discretion).
The implementation literature addresses an analogous problem. E. BARDACH, THE IMPLE-
MENTATION GAME: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A BILL BECOMES LAW 66-95 (1977) lists a
sophisticated agenda for writing an "implementation scenario'-an analysis of the possible
sources of goal-substitution resulting from a proposed draft. Bardach's book contains useful
insights, based, however, not on a general theory of goal-substitution, but rather on shrewd
generalizations from particular instances of goal-substituting behavior. Unlike most authors in
the field, Bardach does discuss explanations before solutions.
100
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lots must retire when the Aeronautics Board deems it desirable that they
do so").4
9
In general, the broader the discretion, the greater the opportunity for
goal-substitution. The drafter must therefore define official discretion as.
narrowly as the situation will allow.
A drafter has a quiverful of techniques available to set discretion at the
desired level. The easiest case arises when the drafter knows precisely
what criteria ought to trigger official decision. ("Douglas fir beams on 4'
centers spanning more than twelve feet and less than fourteen feet in a
fiat roof shall be not less than 3' 5/8" x 7' 5/8" in size.") Even though a
bright-line rule may arbitrarily include or exclude cases that it probably
ought not, ease of administration may nonetheless persuade a drafter to
use a bright-line rule. (The rule, "a person who on a public highway
drives at a speed in excess of 55 miles per hour commits the offense of
speeding," directs a police officer not to arrest a person driving at 55
miles per hour on icy roads or in traffic conditions where that speed may
make driving hazardous, but to arrest a person driving at 60 miles per
hour in clear weather on a vacant highway with a straight, wide, and
smooth roadbed.) Efficiency may also require bright-line rules where de-
cision-makers must make many decisions involving similar fact patterns,
for example, with respect to veterans' pensions.
50
On the other hand, vagueness can also be desirable at times: first,
where only a vague law can muster the support required for passage of
the law (in effect delegating to implementing agencies the task of giving
the vague standards precise content);51 second, where the agency must
have some room to experiment; or third, where the bright-line rule
becomes so detailed and complex that its very precision makes it too
dense for citizens or officials to deal with effectively.52
The more bright-line the rule, the less responsive it becomes to individ-
ual nuance. 53 Bureaucracy tends to transform the individual into a
49. See generally Gifford, supra note 45 (identifying discretionary decisions which can be
constrained); Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983)
(attempting to develop a standard for applying vague rules); Capowski, The Appropriateness
and Design of Categorical Decision-Making Systems, 48 ALB. L. REV. 951 (1984) (comparing
clinical and categorical decision-making).
50. See Gifford, supra note 45, at 103-06.
51. See R. DICKERSON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING 15 (1954).
52. See Simon, supra note 24, at 1226-27 (If all rules are bright-line, too many exist, lead-
ing to imprecision, overload, and indeterminacy for officials and confusion and consequent
inability to deal with the system for citizens.); Diver, supra note 49, at 73; Baldwin & Hawkins,
supra note 45, at 576-78. That very denseness gives officials opportunities to exercise defacto
discretion. If rules become so complex that nobody understands them well enough to use them
to assert rights, an official can use the rules selectively, or even invent rules to justify the
position she wishes to take. Shapiro, supra note 48, at 1505-07.
53. See Diver, supra note 49, at 72-73.
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"case," ignoring factors which the applicable rule does not identify as
relevant. In the turbulent conditions of development, however, law-mak-
ers often simply identify a problem, determine what resources to devote
to its solution, and assign to the bureaucracy the task of finding a solu-
tion. Binding officials responsible for instituting social change with
bright-line rules ensures that they will solve the problems they address
only by chance.
In conditions of development, a drafter has three ways of identifying
relevant criteria for administrative decision. First, the drafter can pro-
vide a list of factors to which the official must "have regard." Because
such a list rarely includes a weighting provision, it hardly constrains an
administrator bent on substituting illegitimate for public goals. She can
readily find a hook on which to hang her decision.5 4 More usefully, the
drafter can leave the administrator space in which to experiment, while
at the same time providing for relatively bright-line rules; she can do this
by setting out bright-line rules and then giving the administrator power
to amend them as experience teaches. Finally, the drafter can require
that the administrator give reasons in writing for specific decisions and
adhere to precedent in the same creative way as do common law judges. 55
In addition to the question of the scope of discretion, the form of a rule
raises the issue of appropriate vocabulary. A drafter of course ought to
use the vocabulary and style best adapted to communicate to the law's
addressees (in our case, the officials who must administer the law). De-
spite two centuries of parliamentary and academic fulminations against
it, countries whose drafters follow the British tradition continue to use an
archaic and convoluted style ("legalese"), so studded with
"hereinbefores" and "hereinafters" and "mutatis mutandis" and incorpo-
rations by reference and deeming provisions that not only laypersons, but
also judges and lawyers and bureaucrats, argue over meaning.5 6 Few
who have studied it defend that style.57 It continues, however, to per-
vade legal drafting for all sorts of reasons unrelated to the law's instru-
mental functions.58
54. See, e.g., Penrose, Some Problems of Policy in the Management ofthe Parastatal Sector
in Tanzania: A Comment, 1 APR. REV. 48, 50 (1972) (referring to a "shopping list" of criteria
for National Development Corporation investment: "[Iln weighing these criteria in any given
case, the difficulty of course lies in the nature of the 'trade-off': how much to sacrifice employ-
ment to improve industrial linkages, or location to increase investible surplus, etc .. "); Lox-
ley & Saul, The Political Economy of the Parastatals, 5 E. AFR. L. REV. 9, 15-22 (1972).
55. See K. DAVIS, supra note 17, at 106-11; GHANA CONST. art. 84(2)(a) (1969).
56. See W. CHAMBLISS & R. SEIDMAN, supra note 15, at 119.
57. See, e.g., Wydick, Plain English for Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 727 (1978); R. DALE,
LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING: A NEW APPROACH (1977).
58. See W. CHAMBLISS & R. SEIDMAN, supra note 15, at 130-35 (legalese continues to be
used because it enhances the power and prestige of lawyers and other interest groups); Fried-
man, Law and its Language, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 563, 566-72 (1964) (legal jailgon is used,
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2. Opportunity and Capacity
Obedience requires that an official have the opportunity and capacity
to obey. Conversely, goal-substitution may occur because she has the
opportunity and capacity to disobey. Opportunities for an official to dis-
obey generally arise because of the peculiar configurations of the bureau-
cracy itself. Opportunity and capacity for official misbehavior, however,
may arise for other reasons. Official corruption, for example, thrives on
poor accounting methods and sloppy paperwork. As procedures for
dealing with money become tighter, corruption becomes more difficult.
If officials cheat on negotiated bids, moving to open public bidding may
help by enlisting other bidders into the control mechanism. 59 (This solu-
tion commended itself to many American lawmakers in response to the
graft disclosed by turn-of-the-century muckrakers.) If the mayoral form
of government tends to produce municipal leaders who lack expertise in
dealing with technical problems of city government, requiring an ap-
pointed, professionally-qualified city manager may seem an appropriate
solution.
Drafters must also consider formal qualifications for officials. The
broader the discretion granted, the more expertise the official requires.
60
A building code addressed to a building inspector with only a high school
education, for example, may require more precise specifications than one
addressed to an inspector with a master's degree in civil engineering.
Specifying the qualifications of the appointed official limits the discre-
tion of the appointing agency. Otherwise, the appointing official may
consult too easily her own interests and biases, a sure way to encourage
patronage. For example, in specifying the qualifications of directors of
public corporations, the British tradition followed by many drafters in
English-speaking Africa requires only that they have suffered neither a
conviction for a crime with a sentence of more than six months imprison-
ment nor a declaration of bankruptcy without discharge.61 That tradi-
tion serves well enough in private corporations, where shareholders elect
the directors. In public corporations, however, it creates the likelihood
that political acceptability and personal influence, not competence, will
determine appointment. 62 A drafter ought to determine the desired qual-
among other reasons, to enhance group cohesiveness and prestige and to command respect for
ritual phrases).
59. See R. SEIDMAN, supra note 24, at 132-44.
60. See, e.g., Etzioni, Organizational Control Structure, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZA-
TIONS 650, 655-58 (J. March ed. 1965) (the greater an organization's selectivity in choosing
participants, the less the need for a control structure).
61. See, e.g., Zimbabwe Development Bank Act, No. 7, § 4(5) (1983).
62. See generally Pozen, Public Corporations in Ghana: A Case Study ill Legal Importa-
tion, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 802.
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ifications for appointment and the means of ascertaining whether a can-
didate has them, and then require them for appointment.
3. Communication
63
Unless an official knows about a rule, she will not wittingly obey it. If
she does not understand the overall governmental policy behind the rule,
frequently she will accord the rule only wooden compliance. This poses
two problems for drafters. First, a government must communicate its
policies to its officials-both senior level personnel and those charged
with carrying out the legislation on the local level. It is more difficult for
a government to reach low-level personnel than senior civil servants. A
secretary of agriculture can easily communicate a new rule to his deputy
secretary two doors down the office corridor. He will have more diffi-
culty communicating the rule to a lowly agricultural assistant or cooper-
ative officer five hundred miles away in the hinterland. In most
developing countries, no institutions exist upon which a drafter can rely
to bridge this gap. The drafter must therefore devise a way to do so.
Second, if a government expects both senior and local officials to em-
brace the new rules in day-to-day decision-making, it must explain to
them the rationale and purpose behind the new legislation. That task
becomes especially important when (as occurred in Zimbabwe in 1980) a
"revolutionary" government takes office and finds itself with many bu-
reaucratic holdovers from an earlier regime. If officials understand the
purpose behind particular legislation, they will be more likely to interpret
the new rules in accordance with the government's objectives. A drafter
can help ensure a sympathetic interpretation of legislative rationales in
several ways: in the British tradition, by the creative use of long title and
preamble;64 in the U.S. tradition, by legislative findings; 65 and in the
tradition of those countries that value it as an interpretive tool, by creat-
ing an appropriate legislative history. 66
63. See generally Seidman, The Communication of Law and the Process of Development hi
Anglophonic Africa, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 682; COMMUNICATIONS AND POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT 665 (L. Pye ed. 1963).
64. G. THORNTON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING 143, 147 (2d ed. 1979); cf 42 U.S.C. § 4331
(1982) (use of a declaration of national environmental'policy as preamble).
65. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1062 (1982).
66. For discussions of legislative history as an aid to interpretation, see Bishin, The Law
Finders: An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1965); Corry, The Use of
Legislative History in the Interpretation of Statutes, 32 CAN. B. REV. 624 (1954); Landis, A
Note on "Statutory Interpretation, "43 HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930); Finley, Crystal Gazing: The
Problem of Legislative History, 45 A.B.A. J. 1281 (1959).
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4. Interest
A great deal of official goal-substitution arises because officials see it as
serving their self-interest. In devising sanctions to counter bureaucratic
self-interest, a drafter can rely on a system of either punishments or re-
wards. In general, punishments tend to stifle, while rewards stimulate,
creativity. 67 In developing countries, creativity comes in short supply.
Where possible, then, a drafter should devise a system resting not on
punishments but on rewards.
To combat bureaucratic self-interest, the criminal law usually comes
first to a drafter's mind, but usually serves that purpose least well. Un-
less a citizen reports official illegality, police and prosecutors rarely un-
cover it. As a practical matter, prosecutors and police have more
pressing problems to consider-murder, rape, robbery. Moreover, con-
stables are unlikely to police the same civil servants who determine their
budget and rewards.68 Judges do not easily convict members of the elite
or subject them to serious criminal penalties.6 9 Other sanctions, mainly
those concerning employment and career, are more likely to work.
The private interests of officials seduce them to three sorts of distorted
decisions. First, self-interest induces officials to respond to those best
positioned to advantage the official. In a stratified society, this means
that unless countered, those with power and privilege will exert a dispro-
portionate influence on government decisions. If a drafter proposes a
statute that aims to help the populace at large (in a Third World country,
the poor), she must devise ways by which the poor can offer rewards or
create difficulties for an official charged with implementing the statute.
This will increase the likelihood that the statute's populist goals are met.
In conventional democratic theory, of course, periodic appeals to the
electorate purport to ensure that elected officials will act in the interest of
the majority. Since, in theory, the bureaucracy constitutes a neutral tool
to carry out the demands of the elected government, periodic elections
are also thought to ensure that the bureaucracy will comply with the
laws that the elected representatives enact.70 By electing our leaders
periodically, we supposedly tame not only elected officials, but also bu-
reaucracy. Experience, however, teaches that the threat of "throwing the
67. See generally BEYOND THE PUNITIVE SOCIETY (H. Wheeler ed. 1973).
68. For a discussion of specific social conditions which make arrest more or less likely, see
Black, The Social Organization of Arrest, 23 STAN. L. REV. 1087 (1971).
69. For example, in 1973 Zambia convicted a former Permanent Secretary for receiving
bribes when he procured citizenship for Asian businessmen who feared measures requiring
Zambian citizenship for ownership of small enterprises. The crimes of which he was convicted
carried a maximum sentence (on five counts) of 25 years. The court imposed only a fine. In
Zambia, the courts are normally harder than this on petty thieves. See R. SEIDMAN, supra
note 24, at 177.
70. See J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 289-96 (1950).
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rascals out of office" some years from now is not enough to guarantee
legality.
A drafter concerned with making it more probable that officials will
make decisions in favor of the disinherited must develop devices by
which the poor, instead of just the rich, can appeal to an official's self-
interest. The rich and powerful always have goodies to dangle before
bureaucrats-outright bribes, directorships in local subsidiaries of multi-
national corporations, promises of employment after retirement from of-
fice, well-paid lectures to friendly groups, and vacations at corporate
hideaways. By definition, the poor cannot offer these perks; therefore, a
drafter must develop other means by which the poor can affect officials'
self-interest. In some cases, it may become possible for a drafter to devise
a system in which an official's tenure depends upon client approval. For
example, the government might nominate the manager of a public corpo-
ration, with final approval subject to a vote of the workers at the plant; or
the local agricultural extension agent may hold tenure at the discretion of
a majority of the local farmers (thus making it less likely that the agent
will favor the most successful farmers); or client assessments of bureau-
crats might count in making promotion decisions (just as in many univer-
sities today student assessments have some weight in tenure decisions).
Second, if officials become part of the economic ruling class, they may
acquire an interest in advancing the interests of the rich and powerful. In
a populist or socialist polity, this may result in goal-substitution. To alle-
viate this problem, the general orders of the civil service in many African
countries-even those not explicitly populist or socialist-usually pre-
clude civil servants from owning more than one house or shares in a
company that does business with the government. 71 Tanzania 72 and
Zambia73 have enacted leadership codes precluding officials from buying
into the entrepreneurial class.
Finally, the structure of bureaucracy produces general, pervasive dis-
tortions of inputs to upper-level decisions. Because bureaucratic superi-
ors tend to give promotions and larger salary increases to subordinates
who tell them what they want to hear, the very nature of hierarchical
administration generally tends to defeat sensible decision-making. 74 De-
71. See, e.g., General Orders, Issued by the Permanent Secretary [Zambia] (Lusaka 1966),
Orders 60(a), 61.
72. Tanzania: The Interim Constitution of Tanzania (Amendment No. 2) (Act No. 40 of
1967), cited in Rahim, Legislative Implementation of the Arusha Declaration, 4 E. AI:R. L.J.
183, 186-94 (1968).
73. The Leadership Code, reprinted in ZAMBIA DAII.Y MAIL, Oct. 26, 1973, at 6, col. 2.
Zimbabwe's ruling party, ZANU, intermittently promised such a code (and actually published
a draft), but never enacted one.
74. See, e.g., H. SIMON, D. SMrrHBURG & V. THOMPSON, PuBIc AI)MINISTRATION 233-
37 (1950).
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cisions based not on what street-level bureaucrats observe, but on what
they think their superiors want to hear, will not usually produce deci-
sions which conform to a law's purpose. A drafter should seek to avoid
this result, perhaps by providing officials with automatic seniority in-
creases in pay and rank (a solution that may, however, reduce initiative).
5. Process
The process by which we learn of a rule and decide whether or how to
obey it often determines our responses.75 The more authoritarian the
process-the more a superior gives orders for inferiors to read and, on
pain of punishment, to obey-the less likely ungrudging official obedi-
ence. Most people are less likely to understand and obey an order that is
given in writing than one given orally and face-to-face. Greater secrecy
in the decision-making process increases the likelihood that an official's
decisions will reflect her personal perspectives. In short, the more higher
authorities communicate to officials by way of participatory, two-way,
face-to-face, oral and open communications channels, the less likely goal-
substitution becomes.
6. Ideology: Domain Assumptions, Values, Attitudes, and
Philosophies
Experience teaches that civil servants will more likely accomplish the
objectives of legislation if they subjectively support those objectives. This
raises two issues: how to devise institutions likely to recruit new candi-
dates for the bureaucracy who support the objectives of development;
and how to create institutions that will socialize existing bureaucrats into
the ways of thinking for which the new government stands. To catalogue
the range of possibilities, however, exceeds the scope of this article.76
Here we note only that a drafter will need to take these issues into
account.
B. The Structure of Decision-Making
Officials make decisions; that is their job. Drafters should draft laws
making it likely that an official's decisions actually carry out the letter
75. See P. LAZARSFELD, B. BERELSON & H. GAUDET, THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE: HOW THE
VOTER MAKES UP HIS MIND IN A PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 120-37, 150-59 (3d ed. 1968)
(electronic media have more influence than print media on voters in election campaigns). But
see Bostian, The Two-Step Flow Theory: Cross Cultural Implications, 47 JOURNALISM Q. 109,
115 (1970) (arguing that mass media have less influence in developing countries).
76. A rich public administration literature considers at length the problems of recruitment
and socialization of African public administrators. See, e.g., Kirk-Greene, The Higher Public
Service, in THE POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION OF NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT 213, 236-38
(L. Blitz ed. 1965).
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and objectives of the law. This is more likely to happen if the input,
feedback, and conversion processes facilitate that result.
1. Input Processes
A variety of processes determine the sorts of output that officials will
produce. First, if officials receive inputs mainly from the elite, they are
likely to make different decisions than if inputs come from the mass.
Elites always have open channels to officials, whether formal or informal.
In countries that flaunt populist goals, the drafter must devise ways to
ensure by rule that the poor will supply inputs. In relatively formal pro-
ceedings, issues of ripeness and standing (for example, to bring a lawsuit
or to be heard on administrative rule-making) define who may supply
inputs. (They do not, however, define who will in fact have the capacity
to do so.) Other devices may be more suitable for informal decision-
making. A statute may require the appointment of an official with a spe-
cific responsibility to search out a particular class of clients, to gather
their inputs, and to ensure that they reach official ears.77 For example,
where a welfare agency makes frequent decisions about children, a
drafter may find it desirable to create a role of children's advocate to
represent their interests. In drafting cooperative law in a male-domi-
nated society, a statute may require the committee (the cooperative ana-
log to a corporate board of directors) to contain a certain percentage of
women.7s Where a land reform ministry must select settlers for settle-
ment projects, a bill might require that the minister receive suggestions
from a board charged with representing potential settlers. Because the
poor seldom have representative organizations, a drafter who conscien-
tiously seeks to secure participation by the poor must consider how to
organize them.
77. Dublin, Rotterdam, Munich, Marseilles, Stockholm, and Vienna are among cities
which have assigned community services representatives to various districts to "provide direct
assistance with social problems and public services, but . . . also [to] serve as an informal
communication channel, aid in the development and successful functioning of cooperative
neighborhood organizations, [and] encourage the growth of local leadership." Moran, Coln-
munication with Citizens: The Movement in European Cities, NAT'L Civic REV., Oct. 1984, at
441-42. The public interest lawyer in the United States sometimes performs an analogous
function. The USSR has made similar provisions in its constitution and statutes. The Soviet
Constitution states that a citizen has "the right to submit to state agencies and public organiza-
tions proposals on improving their activity." KONST. SSSR art. 49 (USSR).
78. Cf. 2 G. MYRDAt., ASIAN DRAMA: AN INQUIRY INTO THE POVERTY Or NATIONS
1338 (1968) (In Southeast Asia, credit cooperatives became "mainly the preserves of the upper
strata in the villages." (footnote omitted)). Everywhere, those with power take advantage of
whichever institutions will serve their interests. In Africa, for example, men have utilized
cooperatives to the detriment of women. See Henne, Women in the Rural Economy: Past,
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Second, without knowledge nobody can supply inputs relevant to deci-
sion. Secrecy precludes popular participation. A drafter concerned that
the populace at large supply inputs to decision must draft provisions that
ensure openness in official deliberation and decision and public access to
government data upon which a decision may rest.
Third, input processes for some sorts of decisions filter through vari-
ous gates and gate-keepers. If an equal employment agency only has of-
fices in locations far from rural areas, agricultural workers may have no
recourse to the agency, and the agency's decisions too easily can, ignore
them-whatever the personal values or attitudes of those in the agency.
If a statute requires a government minister to hold public -hearings, and,
in default of statutory direction, she holds -them all in the capital, she
may receive inputs from urban workers and employers but none from the
rural poor. If an industrial health and safety act provides for court ac-
tions as its principal sanctioning process, and lawyers are expensive,
many just claims may never come to court-and the judges will fail to
produce the decisions desired by the drafters.
Fourth, hearing procedures serve to filter input. A restrictive hearsay
rule may prevent survey evidence from reaching the decision-maker. An
opinion rule may prevent her from learning about the values and atti-
tudes of people affected by the decision. Whether a party may obtain
discovery may determine whether evidence later appears in the proof.
An adjudicator in an adversarial system under some circumstances may
learn less than one in an inquisitorial system.
Finally, input processes include not only matters of fact, but theories
to control decision-in lawsuits, theories of the case; in administrative
rule-making, explanations of the problem and proposals for solution.
Plainly, who proposes theories makes a difference in outcomes. Theories
formulated only by men can disadvantage women. Whether a decision-
maker may call on expert opinion can determine whether her decision is
informed by technical knowledge or by conventional, uninformed lay no-
tions. A governmental ministry all of whose consultants graduated from
Harvard Business School may make different decisions from one whose
consultants have an Eastern European perspective:
2. Feedback Processes
As the bare-bones systems model suggests, feedback constitutes an es-
sential steering mechanism for decision. 79 Through feedback channels,
the decision-maker learns the consequences of her decisions. Feedback
channels institutionalize learning through doing. Unless a government
79. See generally Deutsch, supra note 45, at 497-502.
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can evaluate its own performance, it can only stumble blindly into the
future.
Like all input channels, feedback channels influence decision in favor
of those who have access to them. With respect to feedback, therefore,
drafters have a dual task. First, they must ensure regular evaluation of
governmental actions. Second, they must take care that those who have
access to feedback channels will represent groups or strata that the legis-
lation purports to help.
A variety of techniques exist with which drafters can ensure systematic
evaluation. A sunset provision, for example-providing that, unless re-
enacted, a law will expire after a given time-period-helps to ensure that
the legislature will review the law's effectiveness. 80 Requiring that the
administrator of a program make periodic reports to the executive or the
legislature achieves much the same result.
Evaluation takes a variety of forms. Too often, someone from outside
the project or program descends upon it to see whether it has achieved
the goals originally set by its ministerial creators. For a program aimed
at improving the lot of its clients, this type of evaluation may or may not
succeed in calling the ministry's attention to factors which the clients
believe relevant. Evaluation of that sort may lead only to new ways of
improving ministerial control over the project instead of the lot of the
clients. An alternative-some call it a "learning process"-requires par-
ticipation in the assessment by the clients themselves. 8' Because feed-
back constitutes the steering mechanism of decision, teaching clients to
assess their own projects empowers them to control their own lives.
3. Conversion Processes
The processes by which officials turn inputs and feedbacks into deci-
sions also helps predetermine the range of decisions which are made. A
collegial decision-making process (in the U.S. appellate court style)
makes idiosyncratic results less likely than individual decision-making by
a set of appellate judges (in the British style). If a decision-maker or a
judge must write down the reasoning behind particular decisions, an ar-
bitrary law or ruling becomes less likely.82 Further, requiring decision-
80. See generally D. ROEDERER & P. PALMER, SUNSEr ExIPEcTATION AN) EXII.iENCil
2 (1981).
81. A. SF.IDMAN, EVALUATING Au) TO DEVEI.OPMENT: A PARTICIPATORY LI:ARNING
PROCE:SS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (forthcoming 1987) (on file with the author).
82. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) ("[T]he orderly functioning of the
process of review requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be
clearly disclosed and adequately sustained."). The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(c) (1982), requires that "[a]fter consideration of the relevant matter presented. the
agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and
purpose." See also G. Ei.iis & J. NI'SON, FIEDERAL. RECGUI.ATORY PRoCIss: AGI'NCN
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makers to articulate the considerations behind their decisions helps en-
sure that they overlook nothing of major importance.8 3
C. Institutions to Implement Official Behavior
As a specific technique to induce conforming behavior, the legal order
relies upon implementing agencies that administer stipulated measures.
These measures are of three general sorts: punishments and incentives
("direct" measures); changes in the institutions that affect the addressee's
choice ("roundabout" measures); and educative or propagandistic mea-
sures.84 A drafter, of course, must decide which measures will most
likely induce the desired behavior and which agency can best implement
them. (In practice, the policy-maker most often leaves these crucial deci-
sions up to the drafter.)
1. The Range of Implementing Institutions
What implementing agencies can the drafter invoke to induce individ-
ual officials or official bodies to conform? What relative advantages and
disadvantages do these different agencies possess? Six general types of
institutions suggest themselves.
a. Civil Courts
Traditionally, to enforce the rule of law, the common law relied upon
bright-line rules and the ordinary courts and employed mainly the pre-
rogative writs (mandamus, habeas corpus, prohibition), which in many
places are now expanded by actions for declaratory judgment and injunc-
tive relief.85 Today, use of the civil courts remains a central means by
which citizens seek redress against illegal official behavior. Without ex-
tensive procedural changes, however, courts cannot easily control the
abuse of broad discretionary powers. 86 In any event, the utility of the
civil courts to patrol official misbehavior is limited by the frequently pro-
hibitive expense of bringing a legal action. Except where public interest
PRACTICES & PROCEDURES 64-67 (Supps. 1985 & 1986); Radin, The Requirement of Written
Opinions, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 486, 489 (1930) ("Undoubtedly [the requirement of written opin-
ions] will ... result in well considered opinions .. ") (quoting Samuel M. Wilson, discussing
the Supreme Court during the debate over the California Constitution of 1879).
83. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970) (environmental impact statement).
84. See R. SEIDMAN, supra note 24, at 146-64.
85. See J. GARNER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 201-15 (5th ed. 1979).
86. In recent years the federal courts in the United States have undertaken oversight of a
wide variety of institutions, ranging from prisons to hospitals for the mentally ill. This effort
has required extensive changes in federal court procedures. For a discussion of these develop-
ments, see generally Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1281 (1976).
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lawyers or agencies intervene, litigation remains a remedy available only
to sophisticated and wealthy plaintiffs.
In the United States, two procedural devices and one structural one
have somewhat ameliorated this problem. Class actions8 7 make possible
the lumping together of many small claims so that a lawsuit becomes
economically viable. Statutory counsel fees for successful plaintiffs in ef-
fect make every lawyer a potential "private attorney general," prepared
to act in an entrepreneurial role to litigate a complicated case for a poor
plaintiff (more frequently, a poor class of plaintiffs), in the hope that a
pot of gold lies at the end of the long travail.88 Finally, in the United
States, the government has financed a legal services corporation to supply
lawyers for the poor, often in litigation against the government itself.
b. Criminal Courts
These suffer from the gatekeeper and other problems discussed
earlier.8 9
c. Employment Sanctions
In Britain, senior civil servants nominally serve at the minister's plea-
sure.90 The threat of unemployment presumably suffices to coerce offi-
cials into performing their tasks legally. In reality, though, ministers
almost never fire a senior civil servant, suggesting either that these offi-
cials have an unbelievably low rate of goal-substitution or-much more
likely-that the sanction has little bite.91  In Africa, political control
over senior civil servants has become even more attenuated. In 1931,
under pressure from organized civil servants, the government of Rhode-
sia created a Civil Service Review Board with the sole power to discipline
civil servants. By 1965, all the Board's members were retired senior offi-
cials.92 The Board did not serve as a scourge of the bureaucracy. In
most of the English-speaking independent African states, Britain insisted
that the African independence constitutions provide for an independent
87. English procedural law served as the model for procedural law in all of the English-
speaking states in Africa, except those countries in southern Africa-Zimbabwe, Swaziland,
Lesotho, Botswana, and South Africa-in which Roman-Dutch law became the model.
Neither system employs class actions.
88. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
89. See Black, supra note 68; text accompanying notes 68-69.
90. See J. GARNER, supra note 85, at 40.
91. Without adequate ministerial supervision, the threat of ministerial discharge can
hardly serve greatly to influence official behavior, just as even the most severe criminal sanc-
tions, without adequate implementation, will not effectively deter criminals. In Britain, "well
under" one percent of ministerial decisions actually pass across the minister's desk. K.
WHEARE, MALADMINISTRATION AND ITS REMEDIES 5 (1973).
92. C. PALLEY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA,
1885-1965, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO IMPERIAL CONTROL 472-73 (1966).
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civil service commission with powers analogous to those of Rhodesia's
Board.93 The civil service commissions, however, have rarely exercised
disciplinary power. In practice, therefore, governments have precious
few employment sanctions against senior civil servants. If a drafter




Many states have introduced special bodies to police the administra-
tion: ombudsmen in the Scandinavian states, New Zealand, and
Zimbabwe; procurators in Eastern Europe; Permanent Commissions of
Inquiry in Tanzania and Zambia; Parliamentary Commissioners in Brit-
ain; and Mediateurs in France.95 Their powers, organizations, and pro-
cedures vary widely. All three affect the ombudsman's relative
effectiveness. For example, whether an ombudsman may demand gov-
ernment documents defines her investigative power; whether of her own
motion she may initiate court action defines her independence from the
current government; whether she can object only to individual cases of
maladministration defines her power both to restructure governmental
organizations (schools, hospitals, prisons) and to review the exercise of
discretionary policy-making. Even where the drafter does not wish to
create an all-purpose special policing body, she may want to create an
advisory or review council for the particular institution at hand (for ex-




France, West Germany, and Austria, among others, have found ad-
ministrative courts useful to review government action for alleged arbi-
trariness. 97 These courts have the advantages of tribunals generally-
mainly that they lack the complexity and rigidity of the ordinary courts.
They are, however, more formal than the ombudsman.
93. See, e.g., ZAMBIA CONsT. arts. 114, 115(3) (1964); ZIMB. CONsT. art. 75 (1980).
94. That government corporations supposedly have more power over their employees be-
came a principal reason for hiving off government functions to them. See R. SEIDMAN, supra
note 24, at 258-85.
95. On the Tanzania Permanent Commission of Enquiry, see R. MARTIN, PERSONAL
FREEDOM AND THE LAW IN TANZANIA 181-220 (1974); R. SEIDMAN, supra note 24, at 120.
96. See generally A. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE POLICE (1968).
97. See C. HANSON, EXECUTIVE DISCRETION AND JUDICIAL CONTROL: AN ASPECT OF
THE FRENCH CONSEIL D'ETAT 207-15 (1954); Questiaux, How Administrative Courts Meet the
Need, in THE OMBUDSMAN: CITIZEN'S DEFENDER 217-25 (D. Rowat ed. 1968) (discussing
French administrative courts).
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f. Parliamentary Oversight
Parliament cannot easily oversee the administration's day-to-day activ-
ities. In the British tradition, parliamentary questions purport to per-
form that function. They work only moderately well in Britain and
hardly at all in Africa. 98 A drafter can, however, provide for periodic
review of particular administrative functions, either by requiring periodic
reporting to Parliament by the agency or the responsible ministers or by
providing a "sunset clause" under which the agency will die after a stated
period unless renewed by parliamentary vote. In the General Account-
ing Office, the U.S. Congress has created a full-time agency to assess the
operations of the executive branch on Congress's behalf.
2. New or Existing Institution
Whichever type of implementing institution the drafter selects, she
must decide whether to create a new one or to make do with an existing
one. That decision raises two principal issues. First, new institutions
often generate high start-up costs. Adding new functions to old institu-
tions, however, adds some increment of cost to their operations as well.
Second, existing institutions come complete with existing procedures and
personnel which may not deal appropriately with new functions. Fre-
quently only in a new institution can a drafter provide appropriate new
procedures and personnel with the requisite crusading spirit.
3. Allocation of Discretion
How should the drafter divide discretion between the implementing
agency and the official? When the legislature endows an official with dis-
cretion, presumably it wants the official, with all his special expertise, to
exercise that discretion, rather than a reviewing court, ombudsman, or
civil service commission. In most cases where a client complains about
an official, the official justifies his action by attempting to demonstrate
that his decision lay within the range of his discretion, and that he acted
for rational reasons. A variety of procedural devices exist by which the
drafter can regulate the relationship between an official and the reviewing
agency: she can stipulate the bases for agency review, adjust the quan-
tum of evidence required to support official determinations, or prescribe
procedures for appellate review.
D. Guarding the Guardians: The Imperative of Control from Below
All implementing institutions raise the question of guarding the guard-
ians. This question arises for two reasons. First, no state can afford end-
98. R. SEIDMAN, supra note 24, at 439.
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lessly to proliferate institutions responsible for implementing norms
prescribing official conduct; in any event, at the end of that regression sits
the unguarded guardian. Some theorists stress the importance of a self-
regulating set of senior officials-in Britain, the senior civil services;99 in
the United States, the federal judges.1°° Alternatively, a drafter might
make review bodies collegial in nature. In a collective setting, it becomes
more difficult to substitute individual for group goals; in a collegial insti-
tution, each member serves to guard against goal-substitution by his
colleagues.
The question of guarding the guardians arises for a second reason.
Powerful subjects of regulatory agencies often co-opt the very institutions
designed to discipline them. 10 1 How might a drafter prevent an
ombudsman from so falling under the sway of the official culture that he
smothers civilian complaints instead of vindicating them? Can she pre-
vent judges from so deferring to their social peers (the senior civil ser-
vants) that judicial review becomes an expensive exercise in futility? Can
she ensure that the civil service commission maintains sufficient distance
from senior civil servants so that the threat of sanction carries some bite?
These questions raise the ultimate issue for a polity looking towards
development in favor of the mass. No matter how many control institu-
tions a cautious drafter may pyramid one above the other, tentacles of
power and privilege reach out to subvert them. In the end, policy-mak-
ers must still address the problem of how to guard the guardians.
The answer plainly lies in the institutions which empower the masses
directly to control the bureaucratic organizations responsible for devel-
opment.10 2 Wherever possible, this calls for the decentralization of power
and the devolution of control to small, local groups. In face-to-face
99. See, e.g., E. GLADDEN, CIVIL SERVICES OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1855-1970, at 11-
14, 146-48 (1967) (distinguishing the civil service from bureaucracy and emphasizing its im-
portant role as a "balancing factor" in a developing democracy, dedicated to the impartial
service of the nation).
100. See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HA RV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (as an elite corps
removed from majoritarian pressures, federal judges are more likely than state judges to give
judgments in accordance with constitutional mandates); cf United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1,
79 (Stone, J., dissenting) ("[T]he only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense
of self-restraint.").
101. For example, in colonial Rhodesia, by 1965 the Public Service Board (with broad
powers over the public service) consisted predominantly of members who had spent time in the
public service. C. PALLEY, supra note 92, at 472.
102. A variety of scholars reach the same general conclusion, frequently by asserting "the
primacy of politics." See, e.g., H. VAN GUNSTEREN, supra note 40, at 151 ("A political pro-
cess, in which a plurality of citizens can appear and influence their common history, is not only
a democratic value and an ethical imperative, but also a necessary condition for any kind of
rational government."). To leave the matter on that broad level of generality, however, helps
little more than to advocate "participatory democracy."
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groups, participatory decision-making becomes, if unusual, at least not
inconceivable. 0 3 Many countries have tried to implement this solution,
with mixed results.
1°4
The great difficulty lies in devising institutions likely to lead to popular
control over those bureaucracies that make central government decisions
on complex matters involving either large amounts of capital or a high
degree of expertise. Such decisions, by nature, require experience and
know-how often lacking in the general population. As suggested earlier,
at a minimum the masses, as well as the elite, must have organizations to
represent their specific interests.105 Government should provide the
means to strengthen existing people's organizations and to develop new
ones, such as trade unions, peasant's associations, neighborhood collec-
tives, and consumer cooperatives.
The thorniest question concerns mass political organization. Many
Third World countries have embraced the one-party state. The justifica-
tion for such a state as it has evolved in our time is, on the one hand, that
its nerve ends reach deep into the population, and on the other, that in
the mass's interests it monitors and controls government itself. To the
extent that it fits its own description, the party can fairly claim to provide
democratic control more useful by half than periodic elections dominated
by those who provide the financial muscle for political contenders. Once
it has destroyed whatever power representative democracy may have to
control the state in the interests of the mass, however, then, to the extent
that the party itself becomes bureaucratic and its nerve ends to the mass
atrophy, the one-party state becomes Leviathan incarnate. In an effort to
maintain the party's democratic character, Tanzania and Zambia have
each appended the party constitution as a schedule to the national consti-
tution. 10 6 (As it has never come before a court, the legal consequences of
that move remain obscure.) The problems of the one-party state obvi-
ously stretch far beyond the reach of this paper.
103. See generally J. FINUCANE, RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND BUREAUCRACY IN
TANZANIA: THE CASE OF MWANZA REGION 83-107 (1974); REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON THE STRUCTURE AND RENUMERATION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE IN GHANA (Ghana
1972); R. SEIDMAN, supra note 24, at 315-19.
104. See, e.g., J. FINUCANE, supra note 103.
105. See supra p. 106.
106. For a comparison of party constitutions in Zambia and Tanzania (both one-party
states), see R. SEIDMAN, supra note 24, at 442-54. Tanzania developed a genuinely innovative
institution: competitive non-party elections within a one-party state. See ONE-PARTY DEMOC-
RACY: THE 1965 TANZANIA GENERAL ELECTIONS (L. Cliffe ed. 1967).
116
Vol. 12:84, 1987
Drafting for the Rule of Law
Conclusion
Perhaps academics in the United States can escape the dark side of
bureaucracy. Drafters in the Third World cannot. They must confront
and tame it. Unless officials obey the law, whatever a government tries to
accomplish in favor of the mass will most likely fail. The problems of the
Third World (and increasingly those of the developed countries as well)
call for the exercise of wide discretionary power by officials. Otherwise
the institutional transformations required to bring about development in
favor of the mass will occur only by chance. However, the supposed
requirement of bright-line rules appears to oppose development's impera-
tive of broad discretion. If law constitutes only an ideological device for
creating legitimacy, developing countries must give up either the rule of
law or development itself.
A drafter cannot resolve this dilemmaxby using British or U.S. experi-
ence to find textbook solutions to textbook problems. She cannot resolve
it by adhering to traditional perceptions of the drafter's role. She does
not serve as a mere scrivener to put into law's debatably precise but un-
debatably arcane language the policy prescriptions laid down by the
political leadership. Nor can she resolve the dilemma by perceiving law
as ideology or as a mere source of argument. She can resolve it only by
drafting provisions that make it more likely than not that officials will
use their discretion to carry out the purposes of the rules they implement.
That in turn requires us to change the way we conceptualize and jus-
tify law-that is, our ideology and legitimating myths about law. "By
moving from an ideology of rule administration to one of goal orienta-
tion, public administration can no longer rely on legitimation by statu-
tory powers. Rather, legitimacy must be sought through the very
process of implementation." °10 7 Their usual role forces drafters to think
about the law not in terms of legitimation but in terms of its instrumental
consequences. Official conduct conforming to the rule and its purposes,
however, has as its flip side legitimacy. (We even characterize con-
forming official behavior as "legitimate" behavior.) By drafting laws
which induce legal official behavior, that is, by drafting instrumentally, a
drafter necessarily contributes to law's legitimating function.
Solutions to problems must rest upon explanations. We cannot pro-
pose new law to solve problems of illegal behavior unless we can explain
that behavior in terms of existing law. The explanation put forward here
rests upon a proposition made familiar by American realist and sociolog-
107. Blankenburg, The Waning of Legality in the Concept of Policy Implementation, 7
LAW & POL'Y 487 (1985).
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ical jurisprudence: people behave as they do in the face of a rule of law
by choosing among all the constraints and resources of their environ-
ment, including the threats and promises of the legal order. By building
upon more particular explanations of how the legal order works and why
people obey the law (the ROCCIPI categories) and on a simple systems
model of decision-making institutions, a drafter has available a wide
range of devices to encourage official conformity to law. At the end of
the day, however, experience everywhere teaches that control from above
works only moderately well. Without control from below, development
and legality alike become improbable.
As a tool to ensure legality, bourgeois democracy relies upon a central,
sound insight and a fatally-flawed blueprint. Ultimately, government in
favor of the mass must rest on control by the mass. The blueprint for
bourgeois democracy tries to achieve this result by requiring the political
leadership periodically to request and receive the approval of the
electorate.
Whatever its success in the developed world, as a guarantor of legality
in the Third World, bourgeois democracy has not succeeded. Of course,
no system of control of government by the mass in its own interest is
likely to succeed without requiring government regularly to nourish its
roots with the juices of popular support. Periodic submission to elections
alone, however, does this poorly at best. Unless the leadership becomes
and remains "close to the soil and in touch with the people,"' 0 8 regular
elections will not prevent the development of the "big men," the tribe of
WaBenzi,10 9 and of officials who displace the nominally democratic
objectives of the law with self-interested goals.
The requirement of bottom-up control becomes the sine qua non of
development in favor of the mass. At the same time, without utilizing
the state and its bureaucratic structures, development can hardly occur.
Development cannot come about until a government representing the in-
terests of the mass gains control over the machinery of state and seeks to
use it to change social institutions to favor the mass. This type of change
requires that officials do what the law commands them to do-that is,
that they adhere to legality. Specifically, drafters must design legislation
to ensure legality. They must draft instrumentally. Because a wise in-
strumentalism acknowledges that officials tend to follow not only the dic-
tates of the law but also those imposed by their arenas of choice, in
108. E. Nwosu, supra note 16, at 37 (quoting 2 Planning for Economic Development ili
India 66, U.N. Doc. A/5533/Rev.1/Add.1 (1965)).
109. A common KiSwahili term, meaning those who drive Mercedes-Benz automobiles (a
mark of elite status throughout Africa).
118
Vol. 12:84, 1987
Drafting for the Rule of Law
designing legislation a drafter must take those arenas into consideration.
Even as she tries to utilize legislation to change society, the very legisla-
tion she employs must take into account the society it seeks to change.
Law does not work like a vaccine, injected into an inert social body.110 A
law that does not respond to social dynamics will work only
haphazardly.
Another name for bureaucracy is power. Of course, bureaucrats have
power-its exercise constitutes their function. Unless they exercise
power in appropriate ways, institutional transformations become un-
likely, and undirected institutional change will tend to favor the rich and
powerful, not the disinherited. Without legality, political democracy of
any sort becomes an illusion. Africans fought for the democratic
franchise because they believed, with Nkrumah, that they must first seek
the political kingdom. Without legality, political power atrophies. With-
out legality, development in favor of the mass must fail.
Political devices exist which, if employed, can encourage a governmen-
tal orientation towards legality. The ultimate institutional guarantee of
legality, however, probably lies in the structure and ideology of the polit-
ical party that the government represents and in the extent to which its
nerve ends retain contact with the popular mass. Good intentions on the
part of the top leadership are not enough. Lawyers in the system-espe-
cially parliamentary drafters-must develop expertise to contribute to
the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules. 1I
Confronted with the here-and-now task of drafting legislation likely to
bring about development, vague prescriptions for participatory democ-
racy in effect counsel Third World lawyers to give it up. "Participatory
democracy" advocates tell us that we must destroy organized power and
its usual form, that is, bureaucracy. Like ideologues of the extreme right,
these advocates preach the emasculation of government itself. In the
Third World, where the state trembles in its weakness, to tell lawyers to
abandon bureaucracy is to tell them to turn the polity's destiny over to
the powerful-in the Third World, the transnational corporations. De-
velopment lawyers who take that advice seriously can hardly do more
than assure each other how radical they really.are.
Legality can work simultaneously with the discretionary powers re-
quired to solve development's manifold problems, but only if drafters and
lawyers refuse to permit the apparent deadlock to intimidate them. The
problems of bureaucracy will not vanish before puff-balls of "par-
110. R. KIDDER, CONNECTING LAW AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH
AND THEORY 114 (1983).
111. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46 (rev. ed. 1969).
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ticipatory democracy." Even if they were to do so, no one has figured
out how, without bureaucracy, to carry out many of the tasks required
for development. Third World governments must tame the beast. Tam-
ing it requires democratic participation in decision-making. Devising in-
stitutions to allow such participation, and drafting laws to create and
bolster institutional structures, constitute the development drafter's high-
est calling.
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